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INVESTIGATING THE PRESIDENT: THE




The Constitutional procedure for investigating the President is relatively simple
and straightforward. The process begins in the House of Representatives, "which
shall have the sole Power of Impeachment."' As a matter of tradition, the House has
employed its Judiciary Committee to investigate and report on charges made against
the President.2 After their recommendation, the House, by majority vote, can refer
any or all charges to the Senate for trial.3 The Senate "shall have the sole Power to
try all Impeachments." 4 The Chief Justice presides over the trial and conviction
requires the vote of two-thirds of those senators present.5
The maximum penalty available to the Senate is removal from office6 and
potential disqualification from holding any further public office.7 Of course,
conviction of impeachment does not preclude indictment, trial, judgement and
punishment for offenses in accordance with law. The offenses that serve as the basis
for removal are similarly simple but vague. They are "Treason, Bribery, or other
High Crimes and Misdemeanors."9 The Constitution does not indicate what burden
of proof is required for impeachment or conviction.'0 In fact, it does not define what
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioners' Guide to the October 1997 Term of the United
States Supreme Court, at the University of Tulsa College of Law, December 11, 1998.
t Dean & Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. B.A. Temple University, 1965; J.D. Columbia
University, 1968; Dip. Crim., Cambridge University, 1969.
1. U.S. CONsr., art. I, § 2.
2. See CHAR l s BLACK, IME CmNIEN. A HANDBOOK at 6 (1974).
3. See Impeachment and the U.S. Congress, CONG Q., March, 1974 at I.
4. U.S. CoNsr., art. , § 3.
5. See id.
6. See id. The specific language of § 3 is that "Judgement in cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than
to removal from office." (emphasis added). Whether lesser penalties are available, such as a censure, is the subject of
continuing debate and is beyond the scope of this paper. See Linda Greenhouse, It's Impeachment or Nothing, Panel
is Told by Experts, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 1998, at Al.
7. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3. Conviction can include "disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of Honor,
Trust or Profit under the United States." Id.
8. See BLACK,supra note 2, at 40-41 (stating that criminal procedures must be after impeachment and conviction).
9. U.S. CONST., art. It, § 4.
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activities are included within the phrase "High Crimes and Misdemeanors" to justify
an impeachment or later conviction."
Except for the explicit requirements in the Constitution, the procedures and
standards of impeachment are left first to the House of Representatives and then to
the Senate.' 2 Clearly, it is inconceivable that a court would overturn any conviction
and removal of a President by the Senate because of faulty procedures. 13 As one
commentator noted, "[t]here are ten rules about judicial review of the judgements of
the Senate on impeachments. The first rule is that the courts have, in this, no part to
play. The other nine rules don't matter."'4 This doctrine should apply to all aspects
of the impeachment process, not just the judgement. Undoubtedly, it is in the area of
impeachment in which the Supreme Court should find a political question precluding
judicial review.15
This article suggests the Supreme Court has significantly, but indirectly, gotten
involved in the impeachment process. It is true that the Court has given a clear
indication that th6 impeachment and trial procedures are non-justiciable political
questions.16  Still, in a series of decisions going back to United States v. Nixon
[hereinafter Watergate Tapes case], 7 the Court has consistently minimized
Presidential immunities in judicial proceedings and supported broad power to
judicially supervise investigations of Presidential conduct." These investigations in
turn have become the modem mechanism for pre-impeachment Congressional
review.' 9
10. See BLACK, supra note 2, at 15-18. John Labovitz, a member of the Nixon Impeachment Inquiry staff of the
House Judiciary Committee has indicated that in the Nixon investigation, no impeachment article was approved unless
a majority felt there was "clear and convincing evidence." JOHN LAB vr7, PRESIDEN'AL IMPEACHmEN 90 (1978).
11. See Impeachment and the U.S. Congress, supra note 3, at 6-7 (March 1974) (citing then Congressman's
Ford's comment that an impeachable offense is first whatever a majority of the House and then two-thirds of the Senate
"consider it to be at any given time in history"); BLACK, supra note 2, at 37 (phrase should be limited to offenses which
are "extremely serious," which in some way "corruptorsubvert the political or criminal process" and which are"plainly
wrong in themselves" to any "good citizen.").
12. See Impeachment and the U.S. Congress, supra note 3, at 10-14 (describing the rules for impeachment and
trial in the House and Senate).
13. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1959).
14. BLACK, supra note 2, at 62-63.
15. See MiCHAELGERHARr, THE' FDELIMPActmbrrPRocass 143-46 (1996).
16. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
17. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
18. The Supreme Court has consistently applied strict separation of powers formulas to conflicts between the
executive and legislative branches. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091 (1998) (concerning the
line item veto); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (concerning a budget act); Immigration & Naturalization
Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (concerning a one-house veto). In contrast, it has taken a more pragmatic
approach to situations where the judiciary is given broader authority. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)
(concerning district court supervision of civil proceeding against the President); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361 (1989) (concerning sentencing panels and commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (concerning
appointment and supervision of special prosecutors).
19. Compare LABovrrz, supra note 10, at 49 (1978) (discussing the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson
which occurred after a ten month investigation by House Judiciary Committee) and id. at 184-200 (discussing the
HouseJudiciary Committee using evidence prepared by Special Prosecutors office, Senate Watergate Committee, and
its own staffand witnesses), andBrian Kelly & Major Garrett, Will This PlayEver End, U.S. NEWS & WORLDREPORT,
Nov. 30, 1998 at 21-24 (discussing the House Judiciary Committee relying on evidence submitted by Independent
Counsel and Summary of Information provided by Independent Counsel in his testimony to Committee).
[Vol. 34:289
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INVESTIGATING THE PRESIDENT
II. PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT AS A NON-JUSTICIABLE POLITICAL ISSUE
In the 1993 case of Nixon v. United States [hereinafter Federal Judge Case],20
federal judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr. challenged the procedures by which he was
convicted by the Senate and removed from office. Specifically, he argued that Article
I, § 3 of the Constitution provides that the Senate is to "try" an accused and therefore
proceedings in the Senate must be in the nature of a judicial trial.2' The Supreme
Court held the issue was a political question and non-justiciable.22
There are several reasons why this should be held a non-justiciable question.
First, the legislative history of the Constitutional Convention made it clear there was
no intent to allow judicial review of impeachment proceedings or of trials resulting
from impeachment.23 In addition, the Constitution itself gives the "sole" power of
impeachment to the House and the duty of trial to the Senate.24 Finally, allowing
judicial review would mean a lack of finality and no real relief.2
The Supreme Court specifically indicated its concern about judicial review of
a Presidential impeachment proceeding:
This lack of finality [if there was judicial review of impeachment proceedings]
would manifest itself most dramatically if the President were impeached. The
legitimacy of any successor, and hence his effectiveness, would be impaired
severely, not merely while the judicial process was running its course, but during
any retrial that a differently constituted Senate might conduct if its first judgement
of conviction were invalidated.'
The potential for harm is especially troublesome because of the President's foreign
policy responsibilities. The "briefest uncertainty about who is properly the President
puts national security at risk."27
Thus, it seems clear that the Supreme Court will never directly intervene in an
impeachment investigation or trial. In fact, the federal courts seem unwilling to
intervene directly in any Congressional investigation of the President.' However,
prosecutorial investigations of the President under judicial supervision are a different
20. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
21. See id.at230-31.
22. See id. at 226(1993). In his concurrence, Justice Souter envisioned "different and unusual circumstances that
might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings." Id. at 253.
23. See id. In fact, trials of impeachments were originally proposed at the Constitutional Convention to be done
by the Supreme Court but was transferred to the Senate. See RAOL BERGER, IMPEAcHMENt. THE CoNSrrtuoNAL
PROBLEMS 116-19 (1974).
24. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 229-31.
25. See id. at 236-37.
26. Id. at 236.
27. GERHARDT, supra note 15, at 145.
28. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the Senate Watergate Committee,
investigating the alleged abuses by President Nixon, had no right to relevant White House tapes. See Senate Select
Campaign Committee v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
1999]
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matter.29 Even though the evidence collected by such investigations is available for
impeachment, the Court has yet to find any conflicts between a prosecutor and the
supervising judiciary against the President to be non-justiciable political questions.
Rather, the Court in the Watergate Tapes case and later decisions intervened to
providebroad investigatory power to the Courts and Special Prosecutors and minimal
immunities for the Executive.
Ill. SETI'ING THE PROSECUTORIAL AGENDA: WATERGATE AND THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR
In 1974, for only the second time in the history of the United States,30 the House
of Representatives considered articles of impeachment against a President. 3' The
information presented to the House Judiciary Committee came from public sources,
including records and testimony from the Senate Watergate Committee and evidence
and testimony collected by the Special Prosecutor and the Grand Jury convened by
the Special Prosecutor.32 In other words, if a Special Prosecutor receives informa-
tion, it eventually is available for an impeachment inquiry and later trial.33
This was the context of the review by the United States Supreme Court of a
demand for certain White House tapes recorded by President Nixon in the Watergate
Tapes case. In a speedy34 and unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Burger,35
the Court ordered subpoenaed materials to be turned over to the federal district court
to weigh the importance of the material against the "high degree of respect due the
President of the United States."36
The Supreme Court specifically considered two arguments made by the
President asserting the Court should not enforce the subpoena. First, the President
argued this was a political question and non-justiciable because the dispute was
between the chief executive and one of his subordinates.37 The President urged" the
29. The Supreme Court was willing to quickly hear a request by a prosecutor and supervising judge to obtain
evidence from the President and subsequently forced the President to turn over White House tapes to the trial judge and
then a Special Prosecutor investigating the same alleged abuses. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
30. President Andrew Johnson was, in fact, impeached. He missed getting convicted in the Senate by one vote. See
Impeachment and the U.S. Congress, supra note 3, at 4-5.
31. See U.S. HousE. IPEAcHmENTOFRcHARDM. NiXONPRESIDENmroFTHEUNrEDSTATEs, 1974. H.R. Rep. 93-
1305 (2d Sess. 1974).
32. See LABovrrz, supra note !0, at 189. The stafforganized these into separate "statements of information." Id.
33. After the Supreme Court ordered the release of contested White House tapes, the full recordings were made
available to the staff and committee members ofthe House Judiciary Committee conducting the impeachment inquiry.
See id.
34. The chronology is as follows: On March 1, 1974, the grand jury returned an indictment charging individuals
with various offenses, and including the President as an unindicted coconspirator. On April 18, 1974, a subpoenaduces
tecum was issued to the President asking for certain tapes and writings. On May 20, 1974, the district court denied a
motion to quash. The district court held that the judiciary, not the President, was the final arbiter of a claim ofexecutive
privilege. On May 24, the Special Prosecutor filed a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgement. On May31, the
petition was granted with an expedited briefing schedule. Argument was held on July 8, 1974. The decision was
rendered on July 24, 1974. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,689-91 (1974).
35. Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the decision. See id. at 683.
36. Id. at 715.
37. See id. at 692.
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federal courts should not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government."3 Then, the President argued "the separation of powers doctrine
precludes judicial review of a President's claim of privilege., 39 The Court could have
decided, for policy reasons, it was not entering this quagmire. After all, investiga-
tions of the President have a defined procedure in the Constitution,' and if the
President refuses to honor a subpoena, that could form the basis of an impeachment
article.4'
Instead, the Court almost summarily rejected these arguments, deciding that
whether a subpoena should be enforced is the "kind of controversy courts tradition-
ally resolve."'42 Similarly, the Court rejected the idea that separation of powers
mandates the Chief Executive alone must decide what is within the scope of the
executive privilege.43 The "judicial power of the United States vested in the federal
courts by Art. III, § 1 of the Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive
Branch than the Chief Executive can share with the Judiciary the veto power ....,44
The Supreme Court saw itself as the ultimate arbiter-to balance a claim of privilege
against the "right to every man's evidence." 45
This special authority of the federal courts to oversee investigations of even the
President was reconfirmed in Morrison v. Olson.' As a result of the perceived
success of the use of the "independent" special prosecutor in the Watergate
investigation,47 legislation was passed in 1978 to provide a continuing mechanism for
appointment of independent or special counsel to investigate allegations against high-
ranking federal officials, including the President. 48 Ten years later, the statute was
challenged before the United States Supreme Court.49 All the Justices except Justice
Scalia voted to uphold the statute.50
38. Id. at 692-93.
39. Id. at 703.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 1-15.
41. In fact, the House Judiciary Committee included as one of its Articles of Impeachment, the refusal to comply
with earlier subpoenas, albeit those issued by the Committee. See LABovrrz, supra note 10, at 228-48.
42. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974). See also id. at 697 (stating issues are "traditionally
justiciable;" and within the "traditional scope of Art. III power").
43. See id. at 704.
44. Id. at 704. But see Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091(1998) (declaring that line item veto,
authorized by the Congress cannot be used by the President because it violates separation of powers).
45. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706. The test established for this weighing was:
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the
confidentiality of presidential communications is not significantly diminished by producing
material for a criminal trial under the protected conditions of in camera inspection, and any
absolute executive privilege under Art. II of the Constitution would plainly conflict with the
function of the courts under the Constitution.
Id. at 684-685.
46. 487 U.S. 654,676 (1988).
47. See Katy Harriger, The History of the Independent Counsel Provisions: How the Past Informs the Current
Debate, 49 MERcER L.REv. 489,493-506 (1998); see also, Nick Bravin, Is Morrison v. Olsen StillGoodLaw: The
Court's New Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLuM. L. REv. 1103, 1104 (1998).
48. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521,92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 49, 591-99 (1994) (Title VI)); see also Martin H. Belsky, Considering the Independent Counsel Statute, 27
PHLADYHIUABARREPORER 17, Oct. 1998.
49. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 659 (1998).
50. See id. at 659-60.
1999]
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After first rejecting a technical argument that the statute was invalid because
of the prosecutor appointment procedure,5 the Supreme Court then considered an
argument that allowing the judicial branch to appoint the independent counsel allows
that branch to encroach into areas reserved for other branches.52 The statute allows
a "Special Division" of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit to appoint the independent counsel and to define that person's
jurisdiction.53 Because the Special Division does not specifically review the actions
of the independent counsel, there is "no risk of partisan or biased adjudications of
claims regarding the independent counsel by that court.
54
In his dissent, Justice Scalia questioned the validity of this absolutist statement.
He argues, "[w]hat if they [the panel of judges in the Special Division who select the
independent counsel] are politically partisan, as judges have been known to be, and
select a prosecutor antagonistic to the Administration, or even to the particular indi-
vidual who has been selected for this special treatment? There is no remedy...,5
The Court quickly disposed of the argument that the Independent Counsel
statute violates "separation of powers." The Court distinguished this situation, where
powers are given to the judiciary, from a case "where Congress [is seeking] to
increase its own powers at the expense of the Executive Branch."'56 The powers given
to the Judiciary are "well within the traditional power of the Judiciary." '57 These
statements form the basis for Justice Scalia's angry dissent. The statute, he argues,
goes against executive power.58
Justice Scalia notes that the Court would never allow an accretion of judicial
or legislative power to vest in the Executive Branch, nor allow the powers of the other
two branches to vest in the Legislative Branch.59 So, why did the Court allow its own
branch the power to encroach on the power of the Executive?
51. The technical argument was that the independent counsel was a "principal officer" and thus under Article II,
could only be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Court found that the
independent counsel could be considered an "inferiorofficer"and could therefore be appointed by the courts. Id. at 670-
77.
52. See id. at 681.
53. Id. at 661 n.3.
54. Id. at 683.
55. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 730 (1988) (Justice Scalia dissenting). This is precisely, some argue, what
happened in the Whitewater Investigation. Robert Fiske, Jr. had been appointed to investigate some earlier allegations
against President Clinton and his Administration. He issued a report that exculpated the President and angered
Republican leaders and they asked for his replacement. Attorney General Reno then referred the Whitewater
Investigation to the Special Division. Judge Sentelle, a member of the Special Division, then had a meeting with two
conservative lawmakers from North Carolina who had been critical of Mr. Fiske (Senators Lauch Faircloth and Jesse
Helms). Immediately thereafter, the Special Division decided not to reappoint Fiske, who had been on the job nine
months and had developed a staff and procedures, "despite the obvious efficiency" of doing so, and instead appointed
Kenneth Starr, a former judge on the District of Columbia Circuit and the former Solicitor General in the Bush
Administration. Bravin, supra note 47, at 1126-27. Starr's impartiality has been the subject ofchallenge. Prior to his
appointment as special prosecutor, he had agreed to file a briefopposing Presidential immunity in the Paula Jones case.
One of Starr's witnesses-allegedly tying President Clinton to Whitewater-had been paid by a conservative political
and business leader, as part of that individuals "Arkansas Project" intended to assist in any way with the denigration
of President Clinton. Id. at 1129-30.
56. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,683 (1988).
57. Id. at 695.
58. See id. at 706.
59. See id. at 709-10.
[Vol. 34:289
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Scalia makes an analogy to the justiciability doctrine. Congress can "impeach
the executive who willfully fails to enforce the laws; the executive can decline to
prosecute under unconstitutional statutes." Both actions are non-reviewable.
Similarly, the power to appoint prosecutors rests in the Executive and Congress
should not restrict this power, nor should the Courts enforce any such restriction.6
The Watergate Tapes case and the series of Special Prosecutor62 cases set the
pre-impeachment agenda. Investigations of the President can be undertaken by
judicially appointed independent counsel who are independent of the Executive and
under the supervision of the federal courts.63 The evidence they gather is available
to the House and Senate for impeachment proceedings. 64 Thus, the federal courts,
and ultimately the Supreme Court itself, could decide what evidence is available and
what rights the President has in challenging any proceedings and evidence. Twenty-
four years later, the federal courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court did just that.
IV. SETTING THE PROSECUTORIAL AGENDA: WHITEWATER, JONES, LEWINSKY
AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
In December of 1998, the House of Representatives impeached the President of
the United States by approving articles of impeachment for perjury and obstruction
of justice charges.65 In February of 1999, after holding a full trial with Chief Justice
William Rehnquist presiding, the United States Senate acquitted President Clinton on
both charges.66 The basis for these charges was the report issued by the Independent
Counsel.67 This Counsel was first appointed to investigate allegations that the
President, his wife, and others were involved in a fraud surrounding a land deal in
Arkansas [Whitewater].68
The Independent Counsel was later given authority to investigate other alleged
improprieties by the President, including alleged perjury by the President when he
testified in a civil suit filed by Paula Jones.69 Ultimately, the Independent Counsel
60. Id. at 711.
61. See id. at714-15.
62. In re Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Office of the President v. Office
of the Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F. 3d 910 (8th Cir.
1997), cert. denied sub nom. Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
63. See generally In re Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Office of the
President v. Office of the Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998); In re GrandJury Subpoena DucesTecum, 112
F. 3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct.
2482 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1994).
65. See Francis ClinesAfter the Vote, a Pause; then Back-Pats and Glumness, N.Y.T M-s, Dec.20, 1998, at Al.
66. See Peter Baker & Helen Dewar, Clinton Acquitted; Two ImpeachmentArticles Fail to Win Senate Majority;
Five Republicans Join Democrats in Voting down Both Charges, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1999 at Al.
67. See Alison Mitchell, The Nation: Impeachment Maneuvers; Wrapping Things Up, in Knots, N.Y.TIMES, Nov.
15, 1998 at E3. See also Don Van Natta, Jr., Backing Off (A Little), N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998 at A28.
68. See Bravin, supra note 47, at 1129.
69. See THE STARR REPORt. THE OFmctAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNsEL'S INVESTATION OF THE
PRESIDENTaI 39 (Forum Prima 1998) (hereinafterSTARREPoRT); see also In re Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) cert. denied sub nom. Office of the President v. Office of the Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998);
1999]
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and the HouseJudiciary Committee moved away from any allegations of impeachable
or criminal conduct involving Whitewater and focused exclusively on allegations of
perjury, obstruction of justice, and abuse of power.70
The alleged perjury by the President arose in a deposition given by the President
in a federal civil suit filed by Paula Jones7 alleging that in 1991, President Clinton,
then Governor of Arkansas, made improper sexual advances toward Jones and that
when she rejected these advances, she was punished by her work superiors. 2 In his
deposition, President Clinton was asked about any sexual encounters with White
House Intern, Monica Lewinsky.73 He denied having sex with Lewinsky.74 The
Independent Counsel gathered evidence, including a partial recantation by the
President, and reported to the House Judiciary Committee that this was perjury in a
court proceeding and thus an impeachable offense.
75
The President vigorously opposed any deposition in the Jones case, so long as
he was a sitting President. Specifically, he asked the district court "to dismiss...
without prejudice and to toll any statute of limitations [that may be applicable] until
he is no longer President. 76 The district court denied the request for immunity,
ordered discovery to proceed, but ordered a delay in any trial until after the
completion of Clinton's Presidency. 77 The Eighth Circuit upheld the denial of
immunity and went further holding there was no need to delay trial. 8
Following the precedent established by the Supreme Court in the Watergate
Tapes case, the Eighth Circuit indicated its confidence in the federal judiciary to
exercise its traditional discretion, being "sensitive to the burdens of the presidency
and the demands of the President's schedule" to avoid any separation of powers
problems. 79 The President promptly appealed. Before the Supreme Court, the
President's counsel argued for a political question resolution of the issue.80 They
Bravin, supra note 47, at 1130. The Independent Counsel was also given authority to investigate claims that there were
improprieties in the firing of employees from the White House Travel Office. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
70. See STARR REPORT, supra note 69; see also Alison Mitchell, House Will Decide: GOP Counsel Lays out 15
Reasons to Move Against President, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1998 at A l; Alison Mitchell, The Testing of a President:
The Overview; Judiciary Panel, In Party Votes, Urges Impeachment Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, National Edition, Oct.
6, 1998 at AI.
71. See David Stout, From a Modest Start to a Threat to the Presidency, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 15, 1998, at A28.
72. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 685 (1997). After the decision in this case, the case was remanded back
to the district court. The district court later found insufficient bases for the claim to proceed. See also Dan Balz &
Thomas Edsall, After Paula Jones, WASH. Posr, Nov. 23, 1998, at 10.
73. See STARR REPORT, supra note 69, at 313-32.
74. See id.
75. See id. Some have argued that the Independent Counsel, having first written a brief on behalf of Paula Jones
for the Supreme Court, and then working with Linda Tripp to use tapes of Monica Lewinsky's conversations,
manipulated the Jones case and the follow-up, to secure a new charge against the President. See Anthony Lewis, The
Starr Questions, N.Y.TIMEs, Oct. 20, 1998 at A31; Richard Ben-Veniste, The Case Against Ken Starr, N.Y.TMES,
Oct. 23, 1998 at A23.
76. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S., 681,686 (1997).
77. See Jones v. Clinton, 879 F. Supp. 86, 88 (E.D. Ark. 1996), cert granted, 518 U.S. 1016, affd sub nom.
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1996).
78. See Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1363 (8th Cir. 1996).
79. Id. at 1361.
80. See 520 U.S. 681,684(1997).
[Vol. 34.289
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argued the judicial branch, represented by a federal district court judge, should not
interfere with the activities of the President."! The President, they urged, under
traditional separation of powers analysis, should be able to set his own time schedules
and not report to a federal judge and have that judge set his priorities. 2
The Supreme Court, as it did in the Watergate Tapes case, quickly rejected any
separation of powers argument. According to the Court, the courts are merely
exercising their traditional Article m powers, 3 and thejudiciary should be trusted to
handle any problems. The Court stated there will be "no unacceptable burden on the
President's time and energy., 84 The Court went on to say the district court will
"properly manag[e]" the case so it will be "unlikely to occupy any substantial amount
of [the President's] time."85 The court reaffirmed the primacy of the Judiciary Branch
by finding, "[tihe Federal district court has jurisdiction to decide this case. Like
every other citizen who properly invokes that jurisdiction, respondent has a right to
an orderly disposition of her claims."' 6
Justice Breyer only concurred in the judgement.87 As Justice Scalia did in his.
dissent in the Morrison case, 8 Justice Breyer complained the majority almost
cavalierly disregarded the separation of powers argument madeby thePresident. The
Chief Executive needs his own "independent authority to control his own time and
energy."8 9 This is not a case, he argues, where the issue is official immunity in a
challenge to executive powers; these issues are delegable and others can deal with
those challenges with minimal interference with the President's schedule.90 The civil
lawsuit filed by Paula Jones, he said, is a personal demand on the President's time.9'
Historical precedent indicates that even in challenges to the President's
executive actions, immunity would be required when court "orders could significantly
81. See id.
82. See VINCENTBUGuosi, No ISLANDOFSANrry-PAuLAJoNES v.BILLC-NI N: THESUPREMECOURTONTRAL
38-39 (1998) (referring to the briefs filed by the President's Counsel, Robert Bennett). Bennett continued: "Even
seemingly minorchanges in the President's schedule are imbued with significant portents by observers, both foreign and
domestic. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a President to seek to maintain a pretense of'business as usual' to mask
an impending crisis." Id. at 39. Illustrations cited by Bennett included President Kennedy's "cold" masking his need
to cancel meetings and consider the Cuban Missile crises; President Reagan and President Carter had similar situations
of scheduling duplicity to allow consideration of crises involving respectively Grenada and the American hostages in
Iran. See id. at 39-40.
83. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681,699-706 (1997).
84. Id. at 702.
85. Id.
86. Id.at7lO.
87. Justice Breyer's limited concurrence reads almost like a dissent:
I agree with the majority's determination that a constitutional defense must await a more specific
showing ofneed; I do not agree with what I believe to be an understatement of the "danger." And
I believe that ordinary case-management principles are unlikely to prove sufficient to deal with
private civil lawsuits for damages unless supplemented with a constitutionally based requirement
that district courts schedule proceedings so asto avoid significant interference with the President's
ongoing discharge of his official responsibilities.
Id. at 723-24.
88. It is interesting to note that JusticeScalia didnot dissent or even write a separate opinion in the Paula Jones case.
In fact, it was reported that Justice Scalia made light of the President's arguments. See BUGLiOSI, supra note 82, at 98-
100.
89. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681,711 (1997).
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interfere with [a President's] efforts to carry out his ongoing public responsibili-
ties." ' Justice Breyer urged that lawsuits against the President personally, by
definition, interfere with his time and responsibilities and therefore deserve a delay.93
The majority, of course, rejected these arguments and decided the Judiciary, not
the President, should be the arbiter. They found that Judges can balance the risks of
undue interference, and "[i]n all events, the question whether a specific case should
receive exceptional treatment is more appropriately the subject of the exercise of
judicial discretion than an interpretation of the Constitution." '94 Justice Breyer
considered this hubris stating:
I concede the possibility that district courts, supervised by the Courts of Appeals
and perhaps this Court, might prove able to manage private civil damage actions
against sitting Presidents without significantly interfering with the discharge of
Presidential duties ... Nonetheless, predicting the future is difficult, and I am
skeptical.... A Constitution that separates powers in order to prevent one branch
of Government from significantly threatening the workings of another could not
grant a single judge more than a very limited power to second guess a President's
reasonable determination (announced in open court) of his scheduling needs, nor
could it permit the issuance of a trial scheduling order that would significantly
interfere with the President's discharge of his duties-in a private civil damage
action the trial of which might be postponed without the plaintiff suffering
enormous harm. As Madison pointed out in The Federalist No. 51, "[t]he great
security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same
department consists in giving to those who administer each department the
necessary constitutional means andpersonal motives to resist encroachments of the
others .... 95
V. PRiVILEGES, EVIDENCE, AND THE PRESIDENT
This conflict between the President and the federal courts regarding Executive
authority versus Judiciary powers continued after the Paula Jones case.96 In a case
involving attorney-client confidentiality, the Supreme Court, in dictum, quickly
reaffirmed its minimization of any special immunities or rights of the President in any
criminal or pre-impeachment investigation. The Court found common law privileges,
like those involving attorneys and their clients, are entitled to a broad reading and
92. Id. at 714.
93. See id. at713.
94. Id. at 706.
95. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681,723 (1997).
96. The only "win" for the President did not relate to any special privileges or claims that he made in his capacity
as ChiefExecutive. In Swidler &Berlin v. United States, the Office of Independent Counsel, as part of its investigation
of alleged improprieties in the firing of employees in the White House Travel Office, sought handwritten notes taken
by a lawyer, acting as counsel for Deputy White House Counsel, Vincent W. Foster. Foster's lawyers argued that the
notes were covered by the attorney-client privilege. The Independent Counsel argued that the privilege does not apply
as Foster was now deceased. The Court, in a six to three decision, ruled that the privilege applied posthumously. See
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081,2087 (1998).
[Vol. 34.289
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non-common law privileges, like those involving the President, are to be strictly
construed.97
Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the courts overseeing the independent
counsel's investigations consistently rejected any special privileges by the President
and have minimized even the attorney-client privilege when it is applied to the
President. In a challenge to a subpoena, the President's wife, an attorney, argued she
was entitled to some immunity as to discussions she had with White House counsel
and her counsel.98 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled no executive privilege
exists, because Mrs. Clinton is not the President and no private attorney-client
privilege exists since her meetings also involved government attorneys.99 Addition-
ally, they ruled no government attorney privilege existed because all executivebranch
attorneys must report to the Attorney General)'°
In another case, the Deputy White House Counsel, Bruce Lindsey,'0' was
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury regarding information he obtained from the
President about Monica Lewinsky, the President's interactions with her, and how
those interactions related to the President's later testimony in the Paula Jones case.c"
He refused to comply, arguing that his conversations were covered both by the
attorney-client and executive privileges. 3 The district court, relying on the
Watergate Tapes case, quickly disposed of the executive privilege claim finding there
was a clear need, and that need outweighed any executive privilege.'°4 Regarding the
claims of attorney-client privilege, the D.C. Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit, rejected
any applicable government attorney privilege,0" finding advice or discussions the
President had with Counsel Lindsey about the Paula Jones case were about a "lawsuit
involving President Clinton in his personal capacity" and could not be covered by any
government attorney privilege." 6 The Court said the fact they may relate to potential
impeachment proceedings was irrelevant. 107
97. See id. at 2087-88. The Supreme Court seems to accept the argument made by the Independent Counsel that
executive privilege type "privileges be strictly construed because they are inconsistent with the paramount judicial goal
of truth seeking." Id. at 2087.
98. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d910,914(8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Office
of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 117 S. Ct. 2482 (1997).
99. See id. at 922-23.
100. See id. See also John Q. Barrett, All orNothing, or Maybe Cooperation: Attorney General Power, Conduct,
and Judgement in Relation to the Work of an Independent Counsel, 49 MRCER L. R-v. 519,520-21 (1998).
101. Bruce Lindsey technically had two titles: Deputy White House Counsel and Assistant to the President. In re
Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Office of the President v. Office of the
Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
102. See id. at 1267.
103. See id.
104. The executive privilege issue was not appealed. Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit still opened its opinion by
reaffirming the district court decision. "The Supreme Court and this court have held that even the constitutionally based
executive privilege for presidential communications fundamental to the operation of the government can be overcome
upon a proper showing of need for the evidence in criminal trials and in grand jury proceedings." Id. at 1266-67 (citing
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,707-12 (1974)).
105. Circuit Judge Tatel dissented, arguing that there may be an attomey-client privilege applicable to lawyers
serving the Presidency. Id. at 1283-84.
106. Id. at 1270.
107. See In re Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1276-78 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Office of the
President v. Office of the Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
Thus, to the extent that impeachment proceedings may be on the horizon, the Office of the
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As for the attorney-client privilege generally, the Court of Appeals carved out
a special balancing rule for special prosecutors investigating a President by finding
the President has less rights than an ordinary citizen..8 and a higher justification is
required for confidentiality.'t9
The President has a special obligation to obey the law and his government
lawyer, as an agent of the government, has an obligation to not withhold evidence, but
President contends that White House Counsel must be given maximum protection against grandjury inquiries regarding their efforts to protect the Office of the President, and the President in his
personal capacity, against impeachment. Additionally, the Office of the President notes that the
Independent Counsel serves as a conduit to Congress for information concerning grounds for
impeachment obtained by the grand jury, and, consequently, an exception to the attomey-client
privilege before the grand jury will effectively abrogate any absolute privilege those
communications might otherwise enjoy in future congressional investigations and impeachment
hearings ....
.... Nor is ourconclusion altered by the Office ofthe President's concem overthe possibility that
Independent Counsel will convey otherwise privileged grand jury testimony of White House
Counsel to Congress. First, no one can say with certainty the extent to which a privilege would
generally protect a White House Counsel from testifying at a congressional hearing. The issue is
not presently before the court. Second, the particular procedures and evidentiary rules to be
employed by the House and Senate in any future impeachment proceedings remain entirely
speculative. Finally, whether Congress can abrogate otherwise recognized privileges in the course




[Ilt would be contrary to tradition, common understanding, and our governmental system for the
attorney-client privilege to attach to White House Counsel in the same manner as private counsel.
When government attorneys team, through communications with their clients, of information
related to criminal misconduct, they may not rely on the government attorney-client privilege to
shield such information from disclosure to a grand jury.
Id. at 1278.
109. See id. at 1271-72.
Although the cases decided ... recognize a government attorney-client privilege that is rather
absolute in civil litigation, those cases do not necessarily control the application of the privilege
here. The grand jury, a constitutional body established in the Bill of Rights, "belongs to no branch
of the institutional Government, serving as a kind ofbufferorreferee between the Government and
the people," while the Independent Counsel is by statute an officer of the executive branch
representing the United States. For matters within his jurisdiction, the Independent Counsel acts
in the role of the Attorney General as the country's chief law enforcement officer....
T.... hus, although the traditional privilege between attorneys and clients shields private
relationships from inquiry ineithercivil litigation orcriminal prosecution, competing values arise
when the Office of the President resists demands for information from a federal grand jury and the
nation's chief law enforcement officer. As the drafters of the Restatement recognized, "More
particularized rules may be necessary where one agency of government claims the privilege in
resisting a demand for information by another. Such rules should take account of the complex
considerations of governmental structure, tradition, and regulation that are involved:' For these
reasons, others have agreed that such "considerations" counsel against "expansion of the privilege
to all governmental entities" in all cases. (citations omitted).
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to provide it."' As noted by the Eighth Circuit earlier, government attorneys have an
obligation to report any potential criminal violations to the Attorney General and are
therefore duty bound to not withhold evidence."' The Court rejected the argument
made by one of its members that denying the President the ability to confide in his
government attorney may have a "chilling effect" and cause the President to use only
private counsel for his most serious legal or quasi-legal issues."t2
Finally, the President argued that his official duties may make him unavailable
to private counsel." 3 In a situation where a special prosecutor is investigating the
President and a future impeachment inquiry is possible, he argued, the President
should be free to use his White House counsel to convey confidential information to
his attorney." 4  The D.C. Circuit agreed with the rule but rejected its likely
application finding an intermediary can only convey information and can not act with
private counsel to plan strategy and provide legal advice." 5 Once he does so, he is
no longer an agent but an independent entity and the attorney client privilege does not
apply." 6 If information is given to the President's private counsel in the presence of
his government counsel, then that government counsel must still communicate that
information to requesting authorities." 7 Over the dissents of Justices Breyer and
110. See id. at 1272-73.
With respect to investigations of federal criminal offenses, and especially offenses committed by
those in government, government attorneys stand in a far different position from members of the
private bar. Their duty is not to defend clients against criminal charges and it is not to protect
wrongdoers from public exposure. The constitutional responsibility of the President, and all
members of the Executive Branch, is to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."... Each
of our Presidents has, in the words of the Constitution, sworn that he "will faithfully execute the
Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of [his] Ability, preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States."... Unlike a private practitioner, the loyalties of a
government lawyer therefore cannot and must not lie solely with his or her client agency.
Id. at 1272 (quoting U.S. CONsT. art. I §3).
111. See id. at 1275.
112. Id. at 1284 (Tatel, J., dissenting in part concurring in part); see also id. at 1276 (majority opinion).
113. In re Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1278-79 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, sub nom. Office ofthe President
v. Office of the Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
114. See id.
115. See id. at 1280-81.
116. See id. at 1281.
[T]he district court correctly observed that the intermediary doctrine would not cover instances
when Lindsey consulted with the President's private counsel on litigation strategy.... It would
stretch the intermediary doctrine beyond the logic of its principle to include Lindsey's legal
contributions as an extra lawyer, and we decline to do so. Those contributions, rather than
facilitating the representation of the President's personal counsel, constitute Lindsey's own
independent contribution to the President's cause and cannot therefore be said to be covered by the
intermediary doctrine. One lawyer does not need another lawyer providing supplementary legal
advice to facilitate communications regarding matters of legal strategy.... Upon remand, the
district court should address when, if ever, Lindsey was acting as a true intermediary and allow
him to claim the President's attomey-client privilege as appropriate.
Id.
117. See id. at 1282-83.
If the President wishes to discuss matters jointly between his private counsel and his official
counsel, he must do so cognizant of the differing responsibilities of the two counsel and tailor his
communications appropriately; undoubtedly, his counsel are alert to this need as well. Although
his personal counsel remain fully protected by the absolute attorney- client privilege, a Deputy
White House Counsel like Lindsey may not assert an absolute privilege in the face of a grand jury
subpoena, but only the more limited protection of executive privilege. Consequently, although the
President in his personal capacity has at least some areas of common interest with the Office of the
13
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Ginsburg, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari refusing to consider the
issue of the rights of the President to keep conversations with government counsel
confidential."'8
Another attempt to raise special privileges related to the Chief Executive
similarly failed. The Independent Counsel subpoenaed Secret Service agents to
appear before a grand jury to testify as to what they observed in respect to the
interaction of the President and Monica Lewinsky." 9 The Secret Service objected,
raising what they termed a "[p]rotective service" privilege. 2 ° They asserted that,
except when they observe actions or overhear conversations that give reasonable
grounds to believe the President committed a felony, they should not be required to
testify about information they learned as Secret Service agents performing protective
functions. 2 ' They argued that the "success of [their] protection relies on complete
and unquestioned proximity to the President.' 22 Denying this privilege would mean
"current and future Presidents would inevitably distance themselves from Secret
Service personnel, thereby endangering the life of the Chief Executive."''
The Court stated that it would not weigh these risks because first, no prosecutor
or grand jury would seek testimony about "innocent" or non-criminal acts of the
President and 24 second, the President "has a very strong interest in protecting his own
Presidency, and although there may thus be reason for official and personal counsel to confer, the
overarching duties of Lindsey in his role as a government attorney prevent him from withholding
information about possible criminal misconduct from the grand jury.
Id. at 1283.
118. See Office of the President v. Office of the Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
119. See In reGrandJuryProceedings, No. 98-148 (NHJ), 1998 WL272884, *1 (D.D.C. 1998) (redactedversion),
affd sub nom. In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Rubin v. United States, 119
S. Ct. 464 (1998).
120. See id.
121. Seeid.
122. Id. at *4.
123. Id.
124. See id.
It is not at all clear that a President would push Secret Service protection away if he were acting
legally or even if he were engaged in personally embarrassing acts. Such actions are extremely
unlikely to become the subject ofa grand jury investigation. The claim of the Secret Service that
"any Presidential action-no matter how intrinsically innocent--could later be deemed relevant
to a criminal investigation," is simply not plausible.
Id.
Of course, in the present situation, these are precisely the circumstances. The Office of the Independent Counsel
was seeking testimony about sexual encounters between the President and Monica Lewinsky-not because they were
witnessing criminal conduct but because their testimony would contradict the President's denial in a deposition in the
Paula Jones case. As Justice Breyer said in his dissent to the denial of certiorari on the appeal from the D.C. Circuit's
affirmation:
First, the complexity of modern federal criminal law, codified in several thousand sections of the
United States Code and the virtually infinite variety of factual circumstances that might trigger an
investigation into a possible violation of the law, make it difficult for anyone to know, in advance,
just when a particular set of statements might later appear (to a prosecutor) to be relevant to some
such investigation. Thus, without the privilege, a President could not count on privacy. Rather, he
would have to assume, in respect to many Presidential conversations, some genuine risk that a
nearby Secret Service agent might later have to divulge their contents.
At the same time there may well be conversations-perfectly lawful conversations, concerning,
say, politics orpersonalities-which a President reasonably wouldnot wantdivulged. Unlessthose
conversations clearly fall within the bounds of "executive privilege," the bounds of which are
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 34 [1998], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol34/iss2/5
INVESTIGATING THE PRESIDENT
physical safety."'" The district court, citing the Watergate Tapes case, made it clear
that the Supreme Court indicated it should not recognize new privileges by stating,
"the Supreme Court was willing to recognize a new privilege only when the privilege
had some history in federal law and enjoyed broad state support, and public policy
considerations weighed strongly in favor of recognizing it."' 26
Since no such history or policy reasons support such a privilege, none exists.
As the Supreme Court did in the Watergate Tapes case, the district court stressed
that there were no good reasons to "overcome" the traditional "grand jury's
substantial interest in obtaining evidence of [a] crime[]."' 7 Secret Service agents
would have to provide information as to this and all future investigations of the
President. The D.C. Circuit affirmed."n Relying, as the district court had, on the
Watergate Tapes case, the Court of Appeals said they would not allow a new
privilege which interferes with grand jury judicially supervised proceedings 29 unless
the Secret Service showed a "clear and convincing" need. 3'
The Supreme Court denied certiorari, with dissents by Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer.13 1 Justice Breyer, as he did in the Paula Jones case, challenged the cavalier
approach of the courts to Presidential authority. It is not surprising, he noted, that
there are no precedents here for a protective privilege as this "appears to be the first
effort in U.S. history to compel testimony by agents guarding the President.' 32
Justice Breyer continued by stating:
The physical security of the President of the United States has a special legal role
to play in our constitutional system... . He is the head of state... . Thus, one
could reasonably believe that the law should take special account of the obvious
fact that serious physical harm to the President is a national calamity-by
recognizing a special governmental privilege where needed to help avert that
calamity.13
He then pointed out the tragic history of attempted and successful assassinations, 134
unclear, the only way a President could assure privacy would be to create a physical distance
between himself and his Secret Service staff. The problem, in other words, arises in respect to
ordinary conversations, not in respect to the unusual circumstance of an obvious crime.
Rubin v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 464 (1998).
125. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 98-148 (NHJ), 1998 WL 272884, *4 (D.D.C. 1998) (redacted version),
affdsub nom. In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Rubin v. United States, 119
S. Ct. 464 (1998).
126. Id. at*2.
127. Id. at *5.
128. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Rubin v. United States, 119 S.
Ct. 464 (1998).
129. See id. at 1074. The Court specifically said that its ruling as to the Protective function privilege was limited
to grand jury proceedings and not to any other situation. See id.
130. See id. 1079.
13 1. See Rubin v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998).
132. Id. at 462 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
133. Id.
134. See id. at 463:
The terrible truth, as we all know, is that assassins have killed four American Presidents and have
wounded one other. Nine Presidents have been the subject of assassination attempts, including
1999]
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and referencing President McKinley, noted that "[h]istory also teaches that the
difference between life and death can be a matter of a few feet between a President
and his protectors.' 35
The Supreme Court should not have allowed lower federal courts to decide this
issue. It should have considered the issue itself carefully. 136 These cases, involving
government attorneys and secret service agents indicate that the federal courts will
minimize any special protections for the President, while maximizing the powers of
special prosecutors to investigate. 137 Presidential power is thereby diminished, 38 as
Justice Scalia warned in his dissent in the Morrison case, and the federal courts,
rather than staying out of the fray, have reduced Presidential independence and
substantially effected the balance and separation of powers.139
attempts that have taken place while the President was in the White House itself. In addition, a
would-be assassin fired a pistol at President-elect Roosevelt three weeks before his inauguration,
and the United States has accused a foreign government of planning the assassination of former
President Bush when he visited Kuwait in 1993.
Justice Breyer attached an Appendix to his opinion describing in detail the assaults and assassinations against
Presidents. See id. at 463-64.
135. Id. at 463:
President McKinley, for example, standing in a receiving line at the Pan American Exposition in
Buffalo, was approached by an assassin, gun in hand hidden under a handkerchief. A Secret
Service agentnextto the President, and noticing the handkerchief, might have stopped the assassin.
But there was no agent next to the President, for exposition officials had requested those places.
The assassination succeeded.
By way of contrast, when John Hinckley fired shots at President Reagan, a Secret Service
agent next to the President immediately pushed the President toward a limousine, another pushed
the two men into the car, and a third spread his arms and legs to protect the President (and was hit
in the chest). The President's life wassaved. When a woman pointed a loaded semiautomatic pistol
at President Ford, a Secret Service agent standing next to the President quickly grabbed the
weapon with one hand and the woman's arm with the other. After another agent shouted a code
warning, two agents grabbed the President and othersswiftly surrounded himasthey escorted him
away. Only two weeks later, a shot was fired at President Ford in San Francisco. The President
was immediately shielded and hustled into his limousine. (citations omitted).
136. See id. at 462.
137. See In re Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, sub nom. Office ofthe President
v. Office of the Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
"Although the Independent Counsel statute ensures independent, aggressive prosecution ofwrongdoing, nothing in that
statute disables a President from defending himself or otherwise indicates that Congress intended to deprive the
Presidency of its official privileges." Id.
138. See Neal Devins,A Loss ofControl: Privilege CasesDiminish PresidentialPower, ABA JOURNAL, Oct. 1998
at 26.
139. See Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654,697,713-15 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting):
Besides weakening the Presidency by reducing the zeal of his staff, it must also be obvious that
the institution of the independent counsel enfeebles him more directly in his constant
confrontations with Congress, by eroding his public support. Nothing is so politically effective as
the ability to charge that one's opponent and his associates are not merely wrongheaded, naive,
ineffective, but, in all probability, "crooks." And nothing so effectively gives an appearance of
validity to such charges as a Justice Department investigation and, even better, prosecution....
Thestatute's highly visible procedures assure, moreover, thatunlike most investigations these will
be widely known and prominently displayed.... In sum, this statute does deprive the President
of substantial control over the prosecutory functions performed by the independent counsel, and
it does substantially affect the balance of powers.
16




In the world of "magic [m]irror[s],"' 4 the Supreme Court reflects our legal
reality. As a result of Watergate and post-Watergate standards, impeachment is no
longer the process used to investigate the President.141  At an impeachment, the
President may refuse to comply with certain requests for evidence. Though that
refusal may serve as a basis for an article of impeachment, such requests are
probably not enforceable as an element of the impeachment process and "may well
constitute a non-justiciable political question.'' 42
However, special prosecutors or independent counsel, and their grand juries,
selected by and under the supervision of the federal courts, have broad power to
investigate the President. They and their staffs secure evidence, subpoena witnesses,
organize testimony and exhibits, make plea bargains, and attempt to frame public
opinion by selective leaks and official reports. They also provide the raw material for
the official impeachment process. Information unavailableto an impeachment inquiry
directly can be turned over to the inquiry by the independent counsel. 43 The
impeachment process described in the Constitution, involving the Congress, is at the
end, and not the beginning of any investigation. The disputes over the impeachment
process do not occur in the official political arena of the Congress; they occur in the
grand juries and the courts. The President's claims and powers are not debated
before and by members of Congress but by "officers of the court" before judges and
Justices. The technical rule seems to be that issues involving impeachment are non-
justiciable, and the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, are not supposed to get
involved. The legal reality is that the courts, and especially the Supreme Court, have
become the arena for investigating the President. Their decisions determine the nature
of any investigation, its scope, the evidence available, the rights of the President and
even the identity of the chief inquisitor.
140. See KERMrrHALL, THEMAGic MIRRoR (1989). In his book, Dean Hall quotes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. who said that law is a "magic Mirror" where we can "see reflected, not only our own lives, but lives of all men that
have been." Id. at 4. In other words, the law and its institutions have to be put into their political, social and historical
context. See id.
141. See In re Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1286-87, (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, sub nom. Office of the
President v. Office of the Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part):
The need for the official presidential attorey-client privilege seems particularly strong after
Watergate which, while ushering in a new era of accountability and openness in the highest
echelons of government, also increased the Presidency's vulnerability. Aggressive press and
congressional scrutiny, the personalization of politics, and the enactment of the Independent
Counsel statute-which triggers appointment of an Independent Counsel based on no more than
the existence of "reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted,"have
combined to make the Supreme Court's fear that Presidents have become easy "target[s]," truer
than ever....
142. Id. at 1278 (citing Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,236 (1993)).
143. The Ethics in Government Act, providing for the appointment of independent counsels, specifically provides
that such counsel are to "advise the House of Representatives of any substantial and credible information... that may
constitute grounds for an impeachment." 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1994).
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